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on a Sunday, and the Eagle was not published on Sundays. Furthermore, "Govern-
ment," July 27, 1847, listed in GF 1:51-53 but not Journalism 2, is not found in the 
Eagle for this date. "Altruism," December 23, 1846 [GF 2:359], is correctly printed as 
"Ultraism" in Journalism 2. 
Texas A&M University JEROME LoVING 
JAY GROSSMAN. Reconstituting the American Renaissance: Emerson~ Whitman~ and 
the Politics of Representation. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. 261 pp. 
Since the 1980s, Whitman criticism has been largely occupied with trying to 
understand how Leaves of Grass is informed by the social and political life of 
the antebellum period. Four themes have dominated this endeavor: sexuality, 
slavery, disunion, and the relationship between literary and political represen-
tation. Jay Grossman's awkwardly titled new book focuses mainly on the last 
of these themes, but it touches on all of them, and it therefore bears the bur-
den of distinguishing itself from much of the important Whitman scholarship 
of the last two decades. There are two options for the critic in this situation-
one methodological, the other contextual. One must either challenge the ap-
proach of previous studies and present a new, corrective one in its place or 
provide a new context in which to examine the established themes. Grossman 
does issue a methodological challenge, but his target, Matthiessen's American 
Renaissance, is an old one. When he opposes himself to "the standard model 
derived from Matthiessen in which the abundance of the Renaissance springs, 
Athena-like, out of the head of an Emerson-Zeus" (5) or promises "to interro-
gate the ... standing of [Matthiessen's] representative figures" (25), he is 
following a script that dates back at least to 1985, when Jonathan Arac and 
Donald Pease published critiques of Matthiessen in The American Renaissance 
Reconsidered. By now, attacking Matthiessen has become a gesture of New 
Americanist solidarity rather than a mark of iconoclasm. What matters is where 
Grossman stands in relation to his more recent predecessors. 
Grossman's stronger claim to originality is of the contextual variety. Whereas 
Allen Grossman and Kerry Larson interpreted Whitman's challenge to repre-
sentative institutions in light of the constitutional crises of the 1850s, his book 
traces it back to the anti-Federalist rhetoric of the ratification debates. As 
Grossman puts it, "Reconstituting argues that ... writings by Emerson and 
Whitman ... have their origins in facets of the Constitutional settlement that 
have never wholly ceased reverberating through American literary history" 
(15). This is not an entirely new idea-Larson's important book, Whitman's 
Drama of Consensus, considers the analogy between the Constitution and Leaves 
of Grass at length-but in Grossman's hands it becomes a rationale for de-
tailed cross-century comparison of a kind that is new to Whitman studies. Of 
course, this comparison brings its own challenges-formal as well as histori-
cal-and when Grossman moves from the Federalist in chapter one to Emerson 
and Whitman in chapter two, he raises a host of questions about the political 
thought of the intervening seventy-odd years that are simply beyond the scope 
of a book about Emerson and Whitman. The greater challenge arises, how-
ever, from Grossman's decision to devote a full chapter to the ratification 
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debates in the first place-a decision presumably based on his desire not only 
to provide historical context for what follows but to produce a freestanding 
analysis of the material. Here Grossman disappoints. His portrayal of the Fed-
eralists as counter-revolutionaries seeking to disenfranchise the common people 
through political representation is dated and unconvincing. Relying heavily 
on a view of the Constitution that originates in Charles Beard's largely dis-
credited Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (1913), he omits to mention 
the contrary views of recent constitutional scholars such as Douglass Adair 
and Bruce Ackerman. Moreover, he equates the representational system es-
tablished in the Constitution with the so-called virtual representation that 
Parliament claimed to provide to the colonies in place of elected representa-
tives: "the Constitution makes a virtue out of the very representative virtuality 
that the colonists had decried as British parliamentary tyranny" (9), he writes. 
In other words l Grossman claims that having the right to vote under the Con-
stitution is the same as not having it under British colonialism. As a conse-
quence, one cannot help feeling that when it comes to constitutional history 
and scholarship, Grossman is out of his depth. 
The three chapters that follow seek echoes of the conflict between Federal-
ism and its opponents in the writings of Emerson and Whitman as well as the 
relationship between the two. In Grossman's eyes, Emerson is a latter-day 
Federalist who sees literature as a way "to refine and enlarge the public views" 
(to borrow the language of the Federalist) whereas Whitman is a Jeffersonian 
who rejects the idea that public views need refinement. Grossman finds this 
conflict at work in the two writers' attitudes toward the body, suggesting that 
"Emerson's rejection of the display of the body" in the 1860 Leaves of Grass 
"may have its discursive analogues in the disembodied virtuality of the Phila-
delphia plan, in which the embodied particularity of 'the people' conveniently 
dissolves through the mechanism of representative filtration" (83). Likewise, 
he contrasts Emerson's view of poetry "as a transcription of celestial music" 
with what he believes is Whitman's view of it "as a trade, a form of embodied 
labor" (110), arguing that "Emerson retained [from his ministry] a founda-
tional belief in his own elevated status as truth-giver to the masses" (137), 
whereas Whitman sought to efface his own presence in favor of his working-
class constituency: "politically, Whitman's vision ... may be staging in the 
catalogs a mode of virtual representation in which, by means of his virtual 
absence ... those working men ... is [sic] notlost" (141). For Grossman, the 
writers' contrasting approaches to the common people reflect their different 
class loyalties-Emerson's to the "Boston cultural aristocracy" (122), and 
Whitman's to the laborers of Brooklyn and New York. 
Grossman's emphasis on the class differences between these two writers 
provides an important corrective to the traditional view of their relationship, 
which acknowledges their disagreement about the body but otherwise empha-
sizes their similarities, especially on poetics. But in complicating our under-
standing of the link between Emerson and Whitman, he sometimes simplifies 
their writings. In other words, he tends to locate the contradictions inherent 
in the concept of representativeness in the relationship between the two writ-
ers rather than the writings of either. He observes, for example, that "for his 
commemorative lectures on the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, Whitman 
made himself over into an embodiment of corporate memory, a representa-
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tive, as in Leaves of Grass, figuratively encompassing the whole nation" (151). 
Yet the belief that the poet "apprises us not of his own wealth, but of the 
commonwealth" is Emersonian, and the assumption of that role is no less 
complex or ambiguous in Whitman's case than in Emerson's. Indeed, what 
makes Whitman's claim to be representative any less dubious than that of the 
"chosen body of citizens" Madison envisions in the Federalist no. 10? Oddly 
enough, Grossman does not raise this question; one must look to other critics, 
such as Kerry Larson, for an exploration of the ambiguities of Whitman's 
claim to representative status. Grossman's discussion of the relation between 
literary and political representation in Whitman is thus rather flat, even as his 
discussion of the connection between Whitman and Emerson is unusually 
rich. 
The final chapter of Reconstituting the American Renaissance concerns the 
centrality of slavery to the treatment of the body in Emerson and Whitman. It 
suggests, in effect, that Whitman's greater respect for the body entails a greater 
sympathy for the slave as well. This chapter is also Grossman's most literary, 
containing as it does readings of Whitman's "I Sing the Body Electric," the 
twenty-eight bathers and Negro driver passages in "Song of Myself," "From 
Pent-up Aching Rivers," Franklin Evans, and the early poem, "The Missis-
sippi at Midnight," as well as Emerson's "Experience." (Whitman's poetry is 
almost entirely absent from the previous chapters.) These readings are purely 
thematic, and Grossman sometimes exaggerates the presence of slavery in a 
poem in order to make the material fit the theme. Informed readers will be 
surprised to find the addressee of "Pent-up Aching Rivers," a "Children of 
Adam" poem, characterized as a male slave, just as they will be to discover 
that "The Mississippi at Midnight" is a dramatic monologue spoken by a fugi-
tive slave. And they are likely to consider Grossman's reading of Emerson's 
devastating description of the trauma of losing his son positively bizarre. "I 
seem to have lost a beautiful estate,-no more. I cannot get it nearer to me," 
Emerson writes two years after Waldo's death in "Experience." In Grossman's 
view, this passage "may even offer a glimmer, in an unintended way, of the 
capitalist, plantation practices in which white slave-masters fathered, owned, 
and sold their own slave-children as moveable chattel quantifiable on estate 
inventories" (199-200). 
It is hard to understand why Grossman feels compelled to offer such tenu-
ous readings when Whitman and Emerson provide so much material directly 
about slavery to work with. But it may be because he limits his readings exclu-
sively to what the texts are about instead of attending equally to their repre-
sentational strategies. The possibility that a text's ideological freight might 
reside as much in how it is constructed as in what it says seems not to have 
occurred to him. The result is a tendency to shoehorn the desired theme into 
the text at hand. 
Grossman's discussion of the social gulf dividing Whitman and Emerson 
constitutes a genuine contribution to our understanding of that important 
relationship. Readers searching for insight into the other topics that the book 
addresses will probably want to look elsewhere. 
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